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solid foundation for future research, for which I would like to express to the contributors of
this study my fullest approval and gratitude. (Yukihito Sat$o)
Southeast Asia’s Misunderstood Miracle: Industrial Policy and Economic Devel-
opment in Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia by Jomo K. S. et al., Boulder, Colo.,
Westview Press, 1997, xiv + 196 pp.
In The East Asian Miracle: Economic Growth and Public Policy published in 1993, the
World Bank evaluated governmental roles in economic growth and analyzed their effective-
ness. At about the time that this report was released, there were heated debates among
researchers over the reasons for the rapid economic development that had taken place in
East Asian countries in the lead up to, and during the ﬁrst half of the 1990s. The point in
question was whether this development could be explained wholly in terms of the tradi-
tional neoclassical school that it was achieved through market mechanisms, or whether the
economic growth was the result of selective government interventions. The role of the gov-
ernment was frequently analyzed when examining the Northeast Asian economies, but in-
frequently analyzed when dealing with the Southeast Asian economies. Instead, in some
quarters, Southeast Asian economic growth was ascribed to market mechanisms, with gov-
ernment intervention seen as having proved ineffectual.
In the book under review, the neoclassical school, with its emphasis on free market forces,
has been rejected, along with arguments based on the developmentalist state. The book
criticizes both schools of thought and focuses on the historical analysis of the role of gov-
ernments, especially industrial policy, in the recent economic growth and industrialization
of the second-tier Southeast Asian NICs. I will evaluate this approach with some rigor, and
begin my review with a brief introduction to the book.
Chapter 1 summarizes the principal thrust of the World Bank report, The East Asian
Miracle. While acknowledging considerable government intervention, especially in Japan,
the Republic of Korea, and Taiwan, the report concludes that the gains from industrial policy
are ambiguous. On the other hand, the report concludes that Southeast Asian NICs have
achieved rapid growth and industrialization without resorting to industrial policy (Thai-
land), or by abandoning it (Malaysia and Indonesia). In other words, Southeast Asian gov-
ernments found it difﬁcult to acquire the capabilities needed to implement industrial poli-
cies in a disciplined way. The social and political circumstances in the Northeast Asian
economic miracle are unlikely to prevail elsewhere. The report points instead to the second-
tier Southeast Asian NICs’ supposed record of rapid growth and industrialization without
industrial policy as more desirable, alternative models for emulation. Thus, the Miracle
study claims that second-tier Southeast Asian NICs have grown rapidly by relying on mar-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––
As the book under review was published before the currency crisis of 1997, I have refrained from
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ket forces and minimal but generally supportive government interventions (e.g., in the areas
of primary education and infrastructure provision) without, or even despite bad industrial
policy, i.e., attempting selective policy interventions to promote particular industries.
Chapter 2 outlines important differences between the Southeast Asian NICs and their
Northeast Asian predecessors in terms of the different contributions of resource rents as
well as the motivations and nature of government interventions which have signiﬁcant im-
plications for the growth and structural change in Southeast Asia. As far as their initial
conditions are concerned, unlike the Northeast Asian counterparts, the Southeast Asian NICs
have invested in agricultural expansion and rural development, but have not experienced
any major agrarian reform. The Northeast Asian NICs have progressed precisely because
their lack of natural resource endowments have been more than adequately compensated
for their wealth of human resources which have been created by deliberate government
policies. Regarding industrial policy, the much greater ethnic and cultural homogeneity of
the Northeast Asian newly industrializing societies has probably rendered nationalism a far
more potent force. In contrast, much state intervention in Southeast Asia has mainly been
for redistributive ends, mainly at the behest of politically inﬂuential business interests and
interethnic redistribution. However, in Southeast Asia the conditions for the emergence and
existence of such “relatively autonomous” states have also existed. Such circumstances
have made it possible for the regimes concerned to undertake industrial policy. The national
and ﬁrm-level corporatism which obtains in Japan and Korea is less common in Southeast
Asia. In such societies, Chinese business networks play an important role in reducing some
transaction, information, and other costs as well as risks and in resolving some coordination
and collective action problems not satisfactorily addressed by state intervention.
The World Bank report ascribes the rapid growth in each economy to the application of a
set of common market-friendly economic policies, but it fails to analyze the dynamic changes
in the developing countries which are trying to catch up with the developed countries through
trade, investment, and reshaping the regional division of labor. However, in Chapter 3 the
book analyzes the so-called ﬂying geese theory, or the dynamic chain of structural conver-
sion in which one country’s economic development inspires to promote development of
other countries, as seen in the East Asian nations with mutual geographical proximity. Japa-
nese ﬁrms have thus played a key role in organizing regional networks of production, and
hence in rapidly increasing intra-regional trade ﬂows. Southeast Asian governments and
ﬁrms have become increasingly selective and sophisticated in implementing industrial poli-
cies and attracting as well as regulating such investments as they endeavor to extract greater
advantage from transnational economic linkages. Rapid increase in foreign direct invest-
ment in these countries since the latter half of the 1980s is explained by the sharp apprecia-
tion of the yen in 1985. In addition, this chapter outlines the characteristics of foreign direct
investment from the principal source countries, such as Japan, Taiwan, and Korea.
Chapters 4 to 6 deal with the role of governments in the process of industrialization, and
analyze the industrial policies of Thailand, Malaysia, and Indonesia. The World Bank re-
port concludes that, in Thailand the maintenance of stable macroeconomic management
formed the basis for achieving economic growth with minimal government-directed indus-
trial policy. The book recognizes, in part, the adequacy of the report’s analyses. In the ﬁeld
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Finance, the Bureau of the Budget, and the National Economic and Social Development
Board—have coordinated their economic policies and have continued to carry on the tradi-
tion of maintaining economic stability by precluding political intervention. On the other
hand, the government had no coherent policy to promote speciﬁc industrial sectors within
line ministries in charge of industrial policy. In some cases, party politicians became the
competent authorities for the ministries, and utilized their power for their own purposes.
Industrial policy making in Thailand has been spread across at least seven agencies. As a
result, poor coordination among these agencies and overlapping jurisdictions exacerbated
the lack of coherence. Government policy has not been active in directing and guiding
business to purse industrial growth in the same way as that of the governments of the North-
east Asian NICs. Minor policies which favored speciﬁc industries emerged due to a combi-
nation of successful lobbying by industrial groups and the preferences and biases of bureau-
cratic factions within line ministries.
The book under review refutes the World Bank report view when it states that Thailand’s
industrial development in the latter half of the 1980s cannot be explained only by the effect
of coordination through pricing mechanisms. It points out that the neo-liberal’s focus on
rent seeking has caused them to overlook important contrary evidence of highly effective,
long-standing, and large selective distortions in agricultural markets and to miss equally
important examples of successful selective interventions during the period of import substi-
tution industrialization begun in the 1960s as well as in the export promotion measures
adopted in the 1980s. Another problematical point with the World Bank analysis is, accord-
ing to the book, the tendency of the neo-liberal researchers to view the Thai government as
not having changed at all, and to regard rent-seeking behavior as a quite natural practice. It
is true that politics in Thailand is characterized by the patron-client relationship and the
fragmented implementation of industrial policy. The book argues, however, that Thai poli-
tics has shifted toward liberal corporatism and more rational outcomes with the growing
technical capacity of the Thai bureaucracy, and that this has led to drastic changes in the
policy-making process in both individual sectors and speciﬁc industries. The business com-
munity has become stronger and more ﬁnancially independent and so has become increas-
ingly able to inﬂuence government policies rather than be controlled by the government. By
the early 1980s, individual members of peak business associations were able to persuade
the government to set up a public-private sector forum, the Joint Public and Private Sector
Consultative Committee. Through such channels, the business community has requested
many tax reforms and changes in government regulations to support their export drives and
other business interests.
Malaysia also owes its economic growth to one decisive factor which has been its ability
to attract export-oriented foreign direct investment into the country’s education system,
infrastructure, and legal system. In addition it has focused on macroeconomic stability. This
is an economic developmental approach that is called by the World Bank “functional inter-
ventions.” In Malaysia, the weakness of a general civil service subordinated to vested ethnic
political interests has prioritized the promotion of a Malay rentier business community rather
than the emergence of an efﬁcient, deepening industrial policy. In 1970 the government
announced the New Economic Policy (NEP), and has sought to create the socioeconomic
conditions for national unity through massive economic redistribution programs to achieve249 BOOK REVIEWS
its twin objectives of poverty eradication and the restructuring of society. In the early 1980s,
there was a major push for heavy industries by the Malaysian government. The government’s
objectives included the development of a capital goods sector and greater linkages with the
domestic economy, especially with Bumiputera enterprises. Unfortunately, most of these
heavy industries faced glutted world markets and stiff international competition from the
outset. Financial returns in Malaysian state-owned industry were poor or negative, but im-
proved with better management, macroeconomic recovery, and entry into export markets.
In addition, the sharp decline in Malaysia’s real effective exchange rate in 1986 was accom-
panied by a relaxation of the guidelines imposed under the 1975 Industrial Coordination
Act (ICA)—for example, the requirements for local shareholdings were relaxed—and the
increased incentives under the 1986 Promotion of Investments Act. Together these made
Malaysia an even more attractive place for investment. Conﬁrmation of the mid-1980s change
in policy direction came with the adoption of Vision 2020, seen to favor growth, moderniza-
tion, and industrialization over the NEP’s emphasis on interethnic redistribution.
This book suggest that the nature of much state intervention in Malaysia has been the
target of rent-seeking behavior in the past, combined with a bureaucracy preoccupied with
ethnic redistribution. However, in Vision 2020 there appears to be a greater symbiosis be-
tween large corporate groups and the government with the former appearing to have built
up special relations with some of the top political leaders. Hence, state intervention, includ-
ing industrial policy, in these circumstances must recognize the nature and role of the state
while seeking to ensure its efﬁcacy in achieving national economic objectives. The Malay-
sian government has been establishing the institutions and mechanisms for closer private-
public cooperation and interaction. The World Bank report regards Malaysia’s heavy indus-
trialization efforts as a costly failure. But this ignores the fact that the design of the interven-
tions was poor and the period over which the policy’s effectiveness should be assessed
should be longer when complex learning processes are involved. According to the book,
market forces alone will not be enough for the promotion of industrial development, and
there is a need to remedy market failure with selective government intervention.
In Indonesia, as in other Southeast Asian countries, there is conﬂict between ministers
charged with seeking the protection of the sector under their control and economists who
advocate trade liberalization. This book suggests that the economic policies that have been
implemented result from the struggle between these two institutions. After General Suharto
brought in military control of the government in 1965, the planning of economic policy
adopted by the New Order regime was left in the hands of the Western-backed technocrats
known as the Berkeley maﬁa. They endeavored to consolidate a base for the introduction of
foreign investment and promotion of exports. Following the oil boom in 1973, soaring oil
prices boosted export income and ﬁscal revenues. This made possible the establishment of
many state-owned enterprises and the implementation of major projects. Policies intended
to protect domestic industry were also reinforced. During the period of structural adjust-
ment in the mid-1980s, however, the government implemented a deregulation package which
included the lifting of restrictions on imports and foreign investment, as well as export
promotion in response to decreased export levels and stagnant investment. At this juncture,
however, the technocrats exerted little inﬂuence over industry-speciﬁc intervention in the
form of non-tariff trade barriers until the second oil slump.250 THE DEVELOPING ECONOMIES
Public policy in Indonesia has been quite interventionist where the industrial sector has
been concerned. This book notes, however, that the government did not speciﬁcally plan for
industrial development and did not seem to have pursued a coherent industrial policy. The
problem may very well be with the domestic regulatory environment that discourages do-
mestic competition, rather than high protection. In Indonesia, industrial policy has been
abused by the politically inﬂuential for their self-aggrandizement or perhaps even to further
political ambitions, and the government has had close relationships with private ﬁrms that
have expanded rapidly through rent appropriation thanks to interventionist policies. It is
true, also, that Indonesia’s dynamic comparative advantage cannot be attained solely through
freely functioning markets. It is important to articulate Indonesia’s long-term strategic vi-
sion and ensure that policies and institutions are in place to realize that vision. The book
observes that the bureaucratic attitude in government agencies has changed signiﬁcantly in
the last decade in favor of greater cooperation with private business.
The last chapter, Chapter 7, summarizes lessons from industrial policy in Southeast Asia.
The World Bank report concluded that, unlike the ﬁrst-tier East Asian NICs, the second-tier
Southeast Asian NICs failed to carry out effective intervention because their governments
were not capable of establishing systems that were conducive to private-public sector coop-
eration. In fact, however, since the latter half of the 1980s, Southeast Asian countries have
achieved rapid economic growth under such governments. This fact is in need of a consis-
tent explanation. When a government was strongly inﬂuenced by patron-client relation-
ships that tended to promote rent-seeking behavior, how could it achieve growth without
becoming inefﬁcient? On this point, the book notes: While some motives for state interven-
tion may be described as rent seeking in nature, rent capture essentially involves transfers
which may be considered unfair, but are not necessarily wasteful in the sense that the rent is
entirely dissipated by rent-seeking behavior. This would go a long way toward structuring
rents more effectively to achieve desired policy objectives besides minimizing unnecessary
and undesirable rentier activity as well as rent dissipation due to rent-seeking activities. The
book points out that the quality of governance would obviously also beneﬁt from appropri-
ate institution building as well as a capacity for ﬂexibility in responding to new challenges.
Drawing on the commentary of the book’s seven chapters, I would now like to present
my own conclusions. The World Bank report provides country analyses based on their static
comparative advantages. However, this approach does not offer any meaningful examina-
tion of economic growth in the Southeast Asian countries. In contrast, the book under re-
view is of the opinion that, as stated in Chapter 3, economic growth was achieved in geo-
graphically proximal Southeast Asian countries as they were linked internationally through
direct investment. I share this view. The book notes that in developing countries, selective
government intervention is needed because if they relied only on market mechanisms, they
would not be able to strengthen their competitiveness in areas such as technology, ﬁnance,
human resource development, and infant industry protection. I also accept this analysis. I
wish to emphasize, however, that just as development strategies vary to reﬂect different
conditions in different countries, industrial policies should also be studied from a dynamic
viewpoint that takes into account their history and developmental stages. The World Bank
report suggests that the Southeast Asian NICs’ experience of high growth with minimal
industrial policy and economic liberalization is a more desirable, more feasible, and more251 BOOK REVIEWS
easily emulated alternative for other developing countries than the Northeast Asian experi-
ence of rapid growth and structural change accelerated by industrial policy. This contention
is open to question. The reason for this is that, as the book under review points out, even in
Southeast Asian countries, sustained rapid growth cannot be achieved unless the govern-
ment intervenes through the implementation of industrial policies. Moreover, the govern-
ments must be capable of effective policy implementation.
The discussion in this book includes a few points over which I have some misgivings. In
order to clarify the elements of Southeast Asian economic growth, the book has focused on
industrial policies intended to foster speciﬁc industries (in contrast to the World Bank report
which denies the effectiveness of such industrial policies), and includes a dynamic analysis
related to the developmental stages of each country. I value this approach highly, but am not
convinced by its reasoning. The book views industrial policy as something that is greatly
desirable for Southeast Asian countries, yet admits that rent seeking has often led to
inefﬁciency in these countries. I believe that, before reaching such a conclusion, the book
should have undertaken a detailed analysis of the decision making and operation of indus-
trial policies. If industrial policies proved to be ineffective, then the reasons for the failure
should have been investigated fully. For instance, Southeast Asian countries adopted indus-
trial policies for the automobile industry. It is important, therefore, to compare and discuss
the policies planned for local content, the domestic engine production projects and national
car projects, the way these policies have been applied, and their signiﬁcance. As one way of
approaching this analysis, I have in mind the idea of analyzing the way different players,
such as politicians, economic bureaucrats, business associations, and individual companies,
exerted inﬂuence on each other during the policy-making process.
By referring to the recent achievements of the new institutional and political economy
approaches, the book focuses on the role that selective government intervention, institu-
tions, and organizations played in overcoming market failure in the course of economic
growth. This viewpoint is very important, and one that I thoroughly appreciate. It should be
noted, however, that the mere implementation of policies and establishment of institutions
does not mean change in the industrial structure. The key factor for economic growth is the
way in which companies can efﬁciently conduct their business under well-established poli-
cies and institutions. Further business expansion, and the resultant major changes in the
economic structure, would force governments to formulate new policies and institutions.
Finally, I would like to emphasize the importance of capturing the relationship between
such changes in the economic structure and policies in a dynamic way. (Shigeki Higashi)